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"SUPERVISOR" HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS, LIABILITY INSURANCE AND
THE TREND TOWARDS NEGLIGENCE
Amanda D. Smith*
A lack of settled standards for determining liability in supervisor
hostile environment sexual harassment lawsuits combined with simi-
lar uncertainty in the context of employer liability insurance coverage
has resulted in increased litigation in this area. This Note argues
that the current predominant standard in the employer liability con-
text, which is based on negligence principle should be rejected in
favor of an apparent authority standard, which more appropriately
strikes a balance between encouraging employers to identify harass-
ing behaviors and exonerating them from liability when they do so
and take appropriate remedial action. It further argues that in order
to develop effective mechanisms for preventing supervisor hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment and to adequately compensate victims
courts should consider the cost-shifting effects of employer liability
insurance coverage and also the conduct that substantive standards
will encourage or discourage.
Sexual harassment lawsuits are front page news.' The Anita
Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings, and more recently, a record
high sexual harassment award against the law firm of Baker
& McKenzie2 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's (EEOC) filing of a large sexual harassment suit
against the Mitsubishi Corporation,' have provoked unprece-
dented interest in sexual harassment law, as well as a
predictable amount of controversy." The quantifiable increase
* Associate, Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York. B.A. 1994, Carleton
College; J.D. 1997, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Jackie
Payne, Kaethe Hoffer, and especially my family for their support and assistance, edi-
torial and otherwise.
1. See generally Allen R. Myerson, As Federal Bias Cases Drop, Workers Take Up
the Fight, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at Al (documenting the rise in Title VII suits).
2. See Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 1994 WL 774633 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994).
3. See EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. Of Am., 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996).
4. See Paul E.B. Glad & Richard V Rupp, Employment-Related Liability Claims
and Insurance, in EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY CLAIMS: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT INSURANCE COVERAGE (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 716 1995) (hereinafter EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY CLAIMS); Joseph P. Montele-
one, Recent Developments in Insurance for Employment Related Litigation, in
EMPLOYMENT LAw LIABILITY CLAIMS, supra, at 179.
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in the number of sexual harassment suits filed in the past four
years may also explain at least some of this heightened
awareness.5 The Civil Rights Act of 1991,6 which expanded the
remedies available to sexual harassment plaintiffs under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may be largely responsible
for this increase in litigation.7 Amidst the rising number of
claims, two critical areas of sexual harassment law still re-
main unclear.
First, it is undecided under what circumstances employers
may be held legally responsible for the harassing acts of their
employees, specifically those employees who hold or have held a
supervisory position over the alleged victim of harassment!
Second, a significant increase in liability insurance litigation
has occurred as corporations seek coverage for defense costs and
indemnification for successful sexual harassment awards under
their existing insurance policies! The efforts of corporations to
recover under commercial general liability (CGL) policies have
met with some success in a few jurisdictions." In addition,
several insurers have begun to offer a specialized non-uniform
insurance product: Employment Practices Liability Insurance
(EPLI)." This type of insurance is specifically designed to cover
employers held liable for wrongful employment practices.
12
Currently, there is no uniform understanding regarding
whether, or when, CGL or EPLI policies will cover an
5. See Myerson, supra note 1, at Al.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994) (allowing victims of intentional discrimination
to recover compensatory and punitive damages).
7. For an analysis of the impact of these additional remedies in sexual harass-
ment litigation, see Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage
for Wrongful Employment Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus.
LAW. 689, 695-96 (1994). Although the 1991 amendments affected all Title VII plain-
tiffs, not just those alleging sexual harassment, most of the additional remedies
created by the Act were already available to plaintiffs claiming racial discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Therefore, the rise in cases filed has likely been caused by
the expansion of remedies available to sexual harassment plaintiffs.
8. See Glen Allen Staszewski, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in Finding
Employer Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment,
48 VAND. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1995).
9. See James E. Scheuermann, Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related
Claims, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 778, 779 (1993); see also infra note 84 (discussing the con-
nection between the rise in sexual harassment suits and coverage litigation).
10. See infra Part II.
11. For a partial list of insurers and descriptions of EPLI products, see Karen
Gordon, Overview of Employment Practices Liability and EPLI Market Survey, in
EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY CLAIMS, supra note 4, at 253.
12. See id. at 258.
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employer/insured for employment practices liability, although
there appears to be a growing trend toward allowing coverage."5
Part I of this Note provides a broad overview of the law on
employer liability for supervisor hostile environment sexual
harassment claims and the current standards that determine
liability. Part II outlines the factors that determine the extent
of a corporate employer's insurance coverage, under both CGL
and EPLI policies, for supervisor hostile environment sexual
harassment suits.
Part III identifies the growing similarity between the pre-
dominant employer liability standard for supervisor hostile
environment sexual harassment and the standard most com-
monly used in coverage disputes between the employer and its
insurer. Part III shows how this collapse occurs and argues
that, because the convergence in standards is administratively
appealing to courts, the trend will continue if not checked.
Part IV considers a normative question: In light of the
growing willingness of courts to allow employers to insure
against liability for harassing acts of supervisory employees,
which substantive employer liability standard works best to
fulfill the policy goals of Title VII? Part IV is premised on the
belief that, although the negligence standard described in Part
III is administratively attractive, it may produce undesirable
results, and that other, non-negligence based standards may
be preferable.
Most of the discussion regarding the appropriate standard
for employer liability in supervisor hostile environment sexual
harassment cases includes an analysis of the policy goals of
Title VII itself-preventing discriminatory conduct and com-
pensating the victims of such conduct. 4 Courts that deny
employers insurance coverage for sexual harassment liability
under the employer's CGL often do so on public policy grounds.
13. Because EPLI policies are new, no significant case law has developed that is
specific to these policies. However, many commentators have addressed the policy
concerns about EPLI policies by referring to decisions interpreting CGL and other
general insurance policies. See Joseph P. Monteleone, Employment Practices Liability
Insurance (EPLI) Policies: Who Controls Selection of Defense Counsel, 18 W. NEw ENG.
L. REV. 159, 160 (1996).
14. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1981); see also Maria M.
Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII:
Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM.
HuM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 84 (1992-93) (recognizing that holding employers vicariously
liable for the harassing acts of their supervisory employees best promotes the goals of
Title VII).
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Specifically, courts are wary of the danger of moral hazard15 if
employers are allowed to insure against intentional discrimi-
nation such as sexual harassment."i Therefore, public policy,
whether found in common law or statutes, often explicitly or
implicitly controls the outcome of both substantive actions and
coverage disputes.
Judicial and academic discussion of public policy, however, is
often extremely narrow and mechanical. Academics who
advocate or oppose employer liability under Title VII rarely
consider the implications of the growing availability of
insurance for corporate entities. For example, different
standards for employer liability may be more or less likely to
compromise the compensation goal of Title VII by shifting the
costs of discrimination to insurers.17 Such analyses are
precluded, however, when courts and academics refuse to
consider the intersection of the fields of employer liability and
insurance. Similarly, insurance law scholarship and legislation
has developed, especially in the area of employer liability for
hostile environment sexual harassment claims, almost entirely
without recognition of the unsettled state of employer liability
for such claims."' This development frustrates a central
function of liability insurance-effective risk management. 19
When courts consider the advisability of the various standards
for employer liability, or decide whether to allow coverage on
such claims, they should attempt to effectuate the policy goals
of Title VII with an understanding of the concurrent
development in the law of insurance.
15. The concept of moral hazard reflects the concern that an individual has a
greater tendency to act wrongfully or negligently when he or she is insured against
personal loss.
16. See, e.g., Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692,
700 (Ct. App. 1993) (arguing that it would be contrary to public policy to allow an em-
ployer to shift the loss resulting from intentional, wrongful conduct to its insurer).
17. For example, if an employer is denied coverage, a successful plaintiff may re-
ceive nothing because of the bankruptcy of the employer.
18. But see Wayne E. Borgeest et al., Insurance Coverage for Employment Re-
lated Claims: Uncertainty and Transition, in EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY CLAIMS,
supra note 4, at 7, 10 (stating that the law surrounding employer liability is unpre-
dictable).
19. Because of the fluid state of the law, employers cannot accurately estimate
their liability exposure for the harassing acts of their employees. Depending on their
actual liability, employers may be either inefficiently overinsuring or underinsuring.
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I. CURRENT SUPERVISOR HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT STANDARDS
A plaintiff suing for sexual harassment under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must prove sexual harassment
under one of two theories-"quid pro quo" or "hostile environ-
ment."' ° Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a supervisor
explicitly conditions job advancement or another benefit on
acquiescence to sexual relations.2 Hostile environment sexual
harassment occurs when an employer's conduct "'has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive working environment.'"'
Historically, the question of employer liability for the con-
duct of employees has been cited as the crucial element in
creating a workable and effective regime of sexual harassment
law.2 Furthermore, the employer liability issue has become
increasingly important because several federal courts have
eliminated the possibility of individual liability for supervisors
who have sexually harassed their subordinates.24 Because of
this limitation on individual supervisory liability, showing that
the employer should be held vicariously liable for its em-
ployee's acts may be the only route to recovery for plaintiffs.
20. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
21. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir.
1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir. 1982).
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
23. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 94 (1979).
24. See Wilson v. Wayne County, 856 F. Supp. 1254, 1262 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) re-
manded sub nom. Wilson v. Nutt, 69 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 1995) (following the great
weight of recent authority in holding that there is no individual liability under Title
VII, but recognizing that some courts continue to hold to the contrary). Describing the
circuit split over individual liability, the court explained:
Those cases ... which deny the existence of individual liability have distin-
guished between an agent's liability in his "official capacity" as agent of the
employer and his liability in his "individual capacity." In so doing, they borrow
from the jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
construes "official capacity" suits as proceeding against the government entity
which the individual defendant serves, rather than against the individual de-
fendant personally in his "individual capacity." These courts assert that the
phrase "and any agent" in Title VII's definition of "employer" means agents in
their "official capacities" as representatives of employers.
Id. at 1261-62 (citations omitted).
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Most federal courts agree that employers should be held
strictly liable for the acts of supervisory employees who engage
in quid pro quo harassment of other employees."5 However, the
extent of employer liability for the acts of supervisory employ-
ees who create a hostile work environment is not yet decided. 8
Before the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson,27 courts that considered the question
of employer liability for a supervisor's creation of a hostile
work environment usually decided the issue in one of two
ways. Some courts held that, as in cases of quid pro quo har-
assment, employers should be held strictly liable for the acts of
their supervisory employees that created a hostile work envi-
ronment.28 Other courts found that employers should only be
held liable for supervisor hostile environment claims if the
plaintiff shows that the employer had notice of the harassment
and failed to take any action in response.29 This latter stan-
dard has commonly been called a "notice" or "negligence"
standard.0 Some courts advocating the notice standard traced
their theory of employer liability for supervisor harassment to
25. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1985);
Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir.
1982).
26. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Because of the imposition of strict liability on
employers whose supervisory employees engage in quid pro quo harassment, much of
the current litigation revolves around the issue of how to characterize the harassing
employee in question-as a supervisor, as a co-worker, or as an authority indistin-
guishable from the employer because of the powerful position he holds within the
company. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557-58 (4th Cir. 1987) (failing to
find a supervisory role where a pilot allegedly harassed a flight attendant); cf Katz,
709 F.2d at 255 ("Except in situations where a proprietor, partner or corporate officer
participates personally in the harassing behavior, the plaintiff will have the additional
responsibility of demonstrating the propriety of holding the employer liable under
some theory of respondeat superior."); Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 n.9 (assuming that the
defendant was the plaintiff's supervisor for purposes of discussion). This Note focuses
on classic situations of supervisor sexual harassment, in which the harassing em-
ployee clearly is in a position of authority over the plaintiff but is not the only person
of authority.
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) affid and re-
manded sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding an
employer responsible for the acts of its supervisory employees regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known of the acts' occurrence); Horn, 755 F.2d at
605-06.
29. See Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1986); Katz, 709 F.2d at
255; Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
30. See Ronald Turner, Title VI1 and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 817 (1994)
(discussing a number of cases that either directly or indirectly apply such a standard).
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the common law tort doctrine of respondeat superior." Other
courts vehemently held that the use of respondeat superior
doctrine was not appropriate in the Title VII context because
Congress enacted Title VII to remedy only intentional dis-
crimination.32
In 1986, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment as sex discrimination for the
first time in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.33 However, the
Court refused to state definitively the applicable standard for
employer liability for such claims.34 The Court held that al-
though a specific decision as to employer liability was
premature, both of the standards previously imposed by lower
courts, strict liability and the notice standard, were inappro-
priate.35 The Court held that lower courts should use common-
law agency principles, as articulated in the Restatement of
Agency, to decide the question of employer liability. The Court
reasoned that because Title VII's definition of employer in-
cludes any agent of the employer, Congress intended to limit
employer liability in some respects but did not intend to exon-
erate employers completely.3 However, the Court noted that
employers cannot always insulate themselves from liability
simply by taking formal steps such as establishing a sexual
harassment grievance procedure. 37 Arguably, the Court in
Meritor was attempting to find a middle ground for employer
liability in agency law.
31
The directive of Meritor has been interpreted in various
ways by lower courts. Many courts have used the framework
outlined by the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219,
the approach endorsed in Meritor, to determine employer
31. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 905; see also infra note 68.
32. See Vinson, 753 F.2d at 150-51 ("Title VII is a mandate from Congress to
cure a perceived evil-certain types of discrimination in employment-in a prescribed
fashion. Rules of tort law, on the other hand, have evolved over centuries to meet di-
verse societal demands by allocating risks of harm and duties of care."); see also infra
Part IV (discussing the importance of this distinction).
33. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
34. See id. at 72.
35. See id.
36. See id. (implying that a test for employer liability based on agency law might
provide a middle ground between the strict liability test and the notice standard).
37. See id.
38. See Staszewski, supra note 8, at 1068 ("Justice Rehnquist's opinion, there-
fore, should be viewed as a compromise between the two polar extremes advocated in
the proceedings below.").
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liability.3 9 The Restatement's framework provides, in theory,
several routes by which a plaintiff may prove agency liability:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his ser-
vants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his
servants acting outside the scope of their employ-
ment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the conse-
quences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) The conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the
master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on be-
half of the principal and there was reliance upon
apparent authority, or he was aided in accom-
plishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation.0
The law in the federal circuit courts has coalesced around
several of the theories of agency liability outlined in section
219.4' The three most common standards derived from section
219 are usually referred to as the "knew-or-should-have-
known" standard, the apparent authority standard, and the
respondeat superior standard.42
The most prominent standard now in use is the "knew-or-
should-have-known" standard, derived from the agency
principle enunciated in section 219(2)(b)-that employers may
be held liable if they are negligent or reckless-although it is
not always described in those terms.3 Structurally, this
39. See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir.
1990). For a cogent criticism of the applicability of agency law to sexual harassment,
see Rachel E. Lutner, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of
Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 589.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
41. For a concise analysis of the state of the law in the federal circuits, see Justin
S. Weddle, Title VII Sexual Harassment: Recognizing an Employer's Non-Delegable
Duty to Prevent a Hostile Workplace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 724 (1995).
42. See id. at 734-35.
43. See id. ("The dominant standard in the lower courts is one of direct liability
.. "). Some courts ignore agency principles altogether and base liability on mis-
guided applications of respondeat superior. See Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 n.5; see
also infra note 66.
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standard resembles the notice standard mentioned in Meritor
and is often described in terms of negligence." The First, 5
Second,"' Third, 7 Fourth," Fifth,49 Seventh, ° Eighth,5' Ninth,2
Tenth," and Eleventh Circuits have applied this standard to
determine employer liability." Courts typically formulate the
"knew-or-should-have-known" inquiry as a two part test. The
plaintiff must first show that the employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and then show that the
employer failed to take appropriate remedial action when it
became aware of the harassment.55
A different theory, derived from Restatement (Second) of
Agency section 219(2)(d), and typically called the apparent
authority theory is also in use. Several federal circuits, holding
that the "knew-or-should-have-known" standard is not the
only way for a plaintiff to establish employer liability under
Title VII, have chosen to employ the apparent authority theory
as an alternative. The Second,56 Third,57 Tenth,5 Eleventh, 9
44. See Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 n.5.
45. See Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying
the Title VII standard in the Title IX context).
46. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.
1992) ("[A] plaintiff must prove that the employer either provided no reasonable ave-
nue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.').
47. See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[Uinder
negligence principles, prompt and effective action by the employer will relieve it of
liability."); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990).
48. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987).
49. See Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993).
50. See Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 320 (7th
Cir. 1992).
51. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992).
52. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Hacienda Ho-
tel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. See Hirase-Doi v. US. West Comm., 61 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir. 1995); Hirsch-
feld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990).
54. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989).
55. See Juarez, 957 F.2d at 320 (citing Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,
421 (7th Cir. 1989)).
56. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[An
employer is liable for the discriminatorily abusive work environment created by a
supervisor if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to further the
harassment, or if he was otherwise aided ... by the existence of the agency
relationship.").
57. See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1994).
58. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551-52 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994); Griffith v.
Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994); Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d
at 579; Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987).
59. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir.
1987).
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and D.C." Circuits impute liability to the employer if a plain-
tiff can show that her supervisor acted with actual or apparent
authority.' The EEOC has also recommended this standard. 2
The content of the apparent authority standard varies some-
what between courts, but most courts require the plaintiff to
show that it was reasonable for a third party to believe that
the supervisor had authority over the plaintiff.6 This standard
is closer in many respects to the strict liability standard advo-
cated by the Court of Appeals in Vinson and the concurrence in
Meritor.'
Finally, the Sixth Circuit applies what it calls a respondeat
superior test, analyzing whether the harassment occurred
within the scope of the supervisor's employment.65 This doc-
trine has been widely criticized as misapplied,66 and does not
materially change the argument of this Note. Courts in most
other circuits, finding sexual harassment to be outside the
scope of employment, have rejected the application of respon-
deat superior. The Sixth Circuit standard does provide a good
example, however, of the confusion that pervades the employer
liability question.
When weighing the merits of these standards, scholars occa-
sionally chart them along a spectrum of relative strength, with
the strict liability standard advocated by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Vinson at one end and the lenient notice
60. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing the apparent
authority standard but finding it inapplicable to the facts of the case).
61. The First Circuit may also be developing an apparent authority standard. See
Johnson v. Plastic Packaging, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Mass. 1995).
62. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment (March 19, 1990)
("[A]bsent ... strong ... polic[ies] against sexual harassment .. ., employees [may]
believe that a harassing supervisor's actions will be ignored, tolerated or condoned
.... By implementing.., an effective policy, an employer can divest the supervisor of
apparent authority .... Failure to prohibit or prevent a hostile work environment
would, therefore, be grounds for... liability.").
63. See, e.g., Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1994).
64. See discussion supra accompanying notes 28-38.
65. See Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48, 49-50 (6th Cir. 1996) (attempting
to clarify this standard); see also Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 606, 610 (6th Cir. 1992); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir.
1987).
66. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAw 226 (1992) ("Under agency principles, liability is imputed to the
employer for the torts of its employees committed while acting in the scope of their
employment. This doctrine, sometimes referred to as respondeat superior, is almost
never suitable in a sexual harassment case."); see also Turner, supra note 30.
67. See, e.g., Bouton, 29 F.3d at 106-07.
[VOL. 31:1
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standard used by some pre-Meritor courts at the other.6" The
apparent authority standard is placed at the strict liability
end of the spectrum, while the "knew-or-should-have-known"
test is perceived to be more lenient." Given both the Supreme
Court's holding in Meritor that neither strict liability nor no-
tice liability is appropriate and its advocacy of an intermediate
liability for employers, this analysis of relative strictness is not
particularly useful. In order to accomplish Title VII's goals of
preventing discrimination and compensating its victims,
courts must understand what kinds of behavior the applica-
tion of each standard will prompt in employers.
Courts applying the "knew-or-should-have-known" standard
consistently require employers to have actual knowledge of the
harassment and are reluctant to consider the possibility of
constructive knowledge]70 Despite the holding in Meritor that
the plaintiffs failure to file a complaint should not be disposi-
tive, courts often treat this failure as strong evidence that the
employer had neither knowledge of the harassment nor reason
to know of its occurrence.71
In addition, taking effective remedial action may now be an
insulating device for employers. There is a growing consensus
among commentators that an employer can avoid liability if it
68. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Sex Discrimination: Continuing Clarifications by
the Second Circuit, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 363, 389-90 (1995).
69. See id.
70. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1167 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e
cannot agree with the district court's apparent belief that simply because conduct is
pervasive enough to create an abusive work environment the employer should be
charged with knowledge of the conduct.'); see also Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9
F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The summary judgment record does not establish that
anyone within the company hierarchy was aware of Nash's complaints against Sharp
until she went to the personnel department... [or] that Sharp's conduct took place in
public .... It thus appears that the company did not know nor should it have known
of Sharp's offensive inquisitiveness about Nash.'); Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Com-
munications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Even if we assume that the
vague, second-hand information possessed by Bettendorf [that employees were both-
ered by the sexual behavior of a supervisor] constituted 'knowledge' on her part that
Shkrutz had engaged in sexual harassment, that knowledge cannot be imputed to
AMCI [the employer]."). Other courts have held that a plaintiff can demonstrate that
her employer had constructive knowledge of the harassment by showing the perva-
siveness of the harassment. See Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478
(5th Cir. 1989); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987).
71. See, e.g., Nash, 9 F.3d at 404 n.2 ("The availability of a formal grievance pro-
cedure at ESI [the employer] should be counted strongly in ESI's favor. .. ."); see also
Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A
Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1238
(1991) ("Absent her employer's constructive knowledge, a victim who fails to report
harassment to some responsible manager or supervisor will have difficulty recovering
under the actual-or-constructive-knowledge standard.").
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has a clear policy and takes effective remedial actions once it
fs notified of harassment.72 Consequently, in assessing an
employer's potential liability, courts concentrate almost
exclusively on the employer's conduct after the act of
harassment.73 By focusing on the corporate employer's post-
harassment conduct, courts consistently fail to consider the
actual harm of hostile environment sexual harassment-the
creation of an interpersonal sexual dynamic in the workplace
that is intimidating or offensive. 7 This focus on the employer's
behavior is the result of the negligence-oriented approach of
the "knew-or-should-have-known" standard. Because courts
are comfortable assessing conduct in terms of duty/no duty
and breach/no breach, they are drawn to this negligence-based
standard.75
The "knew-or-should-have-known" standard focuses almost
exclusively on the employer's behavior after it has received
formal notice of the harassment. Although this standard may
give employers powerful incentives to institute formal policies
against sexual harassment and to take swift action once given
notice, it does not encourage employers to affirmatively moni-
tor dynamics between employees so as to prevent harassment
from happening in the first place.
The apparent authority standard used by some courts,
either on its own or in conjunction with the "knew-or-should-
have-known" standard, requires a different factual analysis.
Like the "knew-or-should-have-known" standard, the apparent
authority test consists of a two-part test where the plaintiff
must show first that her harassing supervisor acted with
actual or apparent authority, and second that her employer
failed to take remedial action when it knew of the
harassment.76 When applying this test, some courts focus only
on whether the supervisor somehow came into contact with
the plaintiff through the hierarchy of the organization or
72. See, e.g., Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distrib., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir.
1992) ("[Ilf Tri-State had had an effective sexual harassment policy in place, the re-
sults of this case [finding liability] may have been different.").
73. This inquiry occasionally explicitly takes the form of an analysis of the em-
ployer's "duty." See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Comm., Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir.
1995) ("In evaluating claims for negligence, proximate cause and foreseeability are
typically employed to determine the scope of an employer's duty.").
74. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
75. See Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 783.




whether he had the ability to hire, promote or fire her." Other
courts use a standard which measures apparent authority by
the reasonableness of that authority to a third person. 8
Once again, in order to analyze the effectiveness of the
apparent authority standard in effectuating Title VII's goals, it
is important to consider how the standard focuses a court's
inquiry. The apparent authority standard concentrates less on
the conduct of the employer after formal notice is given, and
more on the nature of the relationship between the harassing
supervisor and the plaintiff.7 9 Unlike the "knew-or-should-
have-known" standard, in which the focus is on post-reporting
conduct, the apparent authority standard focuses on pre-
reporting conduct-the relationship between the harasser and
his victim. Because the apparent authority standard more
accurately identifies meritorious claims, including claims
where the potential plaintiffs workplace is too hostile or
intimidating to permit her to give formal notice of harassment,
it more effectively meets the goals of Title VII than the "knew-
or-should-have-known" standard.
II. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
EMPLOYER DEFENDANTS
Predictably, employers faced with the possibility of large
damage awards and the considerable defense costs associated
with sexual harassment suits are likely to have sought
coverage under a range of insurance policies-from home-
owners' policies to directors and officers (D&O) policies. Also
predictably, insurers have asserted vigorous defenses to these
coverage claims.' This Part focuses only on the coverage
afforded by standard Commercial General Liability (CGL)
policies and new Employment Practices Liability Insurance
77. See, e.g., Watts v. New York City Police Dep't, 724 F. Supp. 99, 106 n.6
(S.D.N.Y 1989).
78. See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that reasonable belief in an agent's apparent authority is required before principal
will be bound).
79. See id. at 110 (stating that courts implicitly acknowledge that "the choice
whether to permit a grievance procedure to alleviate liability under § 219(2)(d) is a
policy decision based on the appropriate amount of deterrence" and that "if employers
are liable whenever supervisors harass their subordinates, they have an economic
incentive ... to recruit, train, and supervise their managers to prevent hostile envi-
ronments").
80. See Scheuermann, supra note 9, at 784-85.
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(EPLI) policies.8' CGL and EPLI policies are most likely to
provide coverage for employer liability in supervisor hostile
environment sexual harassment claims, although the issues
raised in the consideration of CGL and EPLI policies may be
relevant to an analysis of coverage under other policies.
As a general rule, the employer should first consider cover-
age under any applicable EPLI policy. Insurers are less likely
to contest claims made under EPLI policies because these poli-
cies are specifically tailored to cover employment practices
liability such as wrongful termination and discrimination
(including sexual harassment). 2
The contentious issues that arise in coverage litigation are
best described in terms of the defenses an insurer will raise to
an employer's claim for coverage stemming from a supervisor
hostile environment claim. CGL policies typically provide that
the insurer will pay, within applicable limits, those damages
for which the insured (the employer/defendant in the under-
lying sexual harassment suit) becomes legally obligated to pay
because of "personal injury, property damage or advertising
offense... caused by an occurrence" provided that none of the
policy exclusions apply.'
For the most part, the insurer will not be able to deny
coverage based on a lack of bodily injury or property damage
because the plaintiff in the underlying action will have
81. Much of this discussion of CGL and EPLI policies is also relevant to an
analysis of other liability insurance products. In fact, many EPLI policies appear as
endorsements to D&O policies. For a description of those endorsements, see Machson
& Monteleone, supra note 7, at 711-12.
82. In addition, EPLI policies are "claims-made" policies; that is, they cover all
claims made against an insured during the policy coverage period. See Machson &
Monteleone, supra note 7, at 712. In contrast, CGL policies are "occurrence-based"
policies which cover only claims stemming from incidents that occurred during the
coverage period. See id. at 697-98. Most CGL policies written now contain a specific
"employment practices" exclusion that explicitly eliminates coverage for employer
liability resulting from sexual harassment. See id. at 707; see also Western Heritage
Ins. Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs. & Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1995)
(denying coverage because of applicable employment practices exclusion). However,
older CGL policies, without the employment practices exclusion, may still provide
coverage for conduct that occurred within the policy period. This Note considers only
policies potentially covering defense costs and indemnifying the employer for compen-
satory and other non-punitive damages. It does not consider indemnification for
punitive damages, which most jurisdictions reject as against public policy. See Mag-
num Foods, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994); Home Ins.
Co. v. American Home Prod., 873 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1990). But see Grant v. North River
Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
83. Irene A. Sullivan & Adam C. Rosenberg, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful
Termination and Employment Discrimination Claims, in EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY
CLAIMS, supra note 4 at 191, 195-96.
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constructed her pleadings to invoke insurance coverage by
claiming those types of injuries.8 For example, most federal
courts have agreed that the bodily injury provision of CGL
policies does not provide coverage for purely emotional
harms.85 Therefore, a plaintiff in a sexual harassment action
will likely plead that she suffered physical injury in addition
to emotional injury in order to trigger coverage under the CGL
policy of her employer. By alleging even slight physical
manifestations of an emotional injury, such as headaches or
insomnia, a plaintiff will trigger coverage under CGL policies
in most jurisdictions."
An insurer seeking to avoid coverage may be more success-
ful, however, in arguing that the underlying acts of
harassment do not constitute an occurrence under the CGL
policy. An "occurrence" is defined by most CGL policies as con-
duct not expected or intended by the insured. 7 Therefore,
accidental or negligent conduct is covered by typical CGL poli-
cies while intentional conduct is not.8 In the context of a
coverage dispute over an underlying sexual harassment claim,
this negligent/intentional distinction becomes crucial to sev-
eral aspects of the coverage inquiry.
As an initial matter, the insurer will argue that sexual har-
assment is intentional conduct, and not an occurrence, so that
the policy language on its face prohibits coverage. The in-
sured/employer may respond with two arguments, attempting
to cast the employer's conduct as non-intentional in order to
trigger coverage.
First, the insured/employer may invoke the "act/injury"
exception, arguing that while the harassing conduct itself may
84. See Wayne N. Outten, Evaluating Plaintiff's Case and Settlement Opportuni-
ties: Plaintiff's Perspective, in EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY CLAIMS, supra note 4, at
30-31 ("The way you draft the complaint may determine whether your claims are
covered by the defendant's insurance.") The typical litigation will involve a "triangular
relationship," which may produce incentives for collusion between any two of the par-
ties. This triangular relationship may play out in sexual harassment suits in several
forms, the most obvious of which is the collusion between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant in the underlying sexual harassment suit to invoke insurance coverage through
pleadings. This procedural incentive alone may account for the growing number of
coverage disputes.
85. See Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distribs., Inc., 839 F. Supp.
376, 379 (D.S.C. 1993); Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 129 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
But see NPS Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 517 A.2d 1211, 1212 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (recognizing that "bodily injury" can include purely emotional harm).
86. Michael J. Brady et al., Insurance Coverage Issues Arising from Workplace
Tbrt Claims, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 354, 356 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Machson & Monteleone, supra note 7, at 699.
88. See Brady et al., supra note 86, at 357.
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have been intentional, the injurious consequence of that
conduct was not.89 While this exception has been used by
courts to allow coverage in the past, its use in the sexual
harassment context has been limited.' Courts considering
coverage for underlying acts of sexual harassment usually
have held that the intent to cause injury may be inferred from
the intent to acte' or have ignored the "act/injury" exception
altogether.'
Second, the insured/employer may argue that while the su-
pervisor's conduct was intentional, the corporate entity's
conduct was not intentional and therefore coverage should be
allowed for the employer." This latter argument has been per-
suasive. Several courts have required insurers to defend
against and indemnify negligence claims, such as negligent
supervision or investigation, even when coverage is barred for
the intentional acts of the individual harasser."
In addition to arguing that coverage should be denied
because of the occurrence requirement, the insurer will argue
that coverage should be barred for underlying acts of sexual
harassment because of the strong statutory and judicial policy
against insurance coverage for intentional discrimination." In
89. See Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Co-op Supply, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1438, 1441
(D. Mont. 1988) ("U]nintended bodily injury falls within the purview of the definition
[of occurrence] regardless of the fact that the operative conduct, i.e., [the insured's]
actions in terminating [the employee,] was intentional.").
90. See Sullivan & Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 220-21.
91. See, e.g., Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that the "demotion and discharge were intentional acts, and the
natural, foreseeable and 'expected' result of those acts was injury to the complain-
ant").
92. See, e.g., Presidential Hotel v. Canal Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1988) (ignoring the act/injury distinction).
93. For a discussion of who must expect or intend the resulting injury in order to
trigger coverage, see Scheuermann, supra note 9, at 788 ("Coverage should be barred
by the expected or intended proviso only if the insurer can prove that the policy-
holder's responsible effective management expected or intended the injuries of which
the plaintiff is complaining.").
94. See Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44, 47
(D.N.H. 1987); see also Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295, 1297
(9th Cir. 1973) (holding that an insurance policy may indemnify the insured for an
intentional act when the insured's liability is vicarious but not when the insured is
personally at fault). This formulation has been termed the "innocent co-insured the-
ory," see Glad & Rupp, supra note 4, at 127-28, and the "'imputed liability' exception
to the public policy exclusion." See Sean W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclu-
sion and Insurance for Intentional Employment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1256, 1276 n.93 (1994).
95. Cf Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that sexual harassment is intentional conduct and an insurer has
no duty to defend a policyholder from such a suit).
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New York, this policy was originally expressed in a 1963
opinion of the New York Superintendent of Insurance, which
stated that insurance coverage for discrimination-based
liability "may not lawfully be written under the New York
Insurance Law."9 In California, this policy is evidenced in
section 533 of the Insurance Code, which states that an
"insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the
insured ....
The public policy against insuring for intentional torts is
generally grounded in a fear of moral hazard, the danger that
insurance may encourage wrongful or negligent behavior. For
example, one Arizona state court has noted:
[Wie conclude that there is no coverage for an insured's
intentional acts, wrongful under the law of torts, because
contractual intent and public policy coincide to prevent an
insured from acting wrongfully knowing his insurance
company will pay the damages."
Therefore, both state and federal courts, as well as state
legislatures, have invoked the public policy against insuring
for intentional conduct. In fact, some courts have explicitly in-
voked the public policy discussed above with respect to
insurance coverage for sexual harassment claims." For exam-
ple, California courts have interpreted section 533 of the
Insurance Code as prohibiting the indemnification of an in-
sured employer against claims of quid pro quo sexual
harassment."° In Coit, which involved quid pro quo harass-
ment by the company president,"' the California Court of
Appeals held that section 533 mandated a reading of the in-
tentional acts exclusion of the employer's CGL policy to bar
96. Opinion of the New York Superintendent of Insurance (September 26, 1963)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
97. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993).
98. Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
99. See Coit, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 695-96. The Coit court's finding of no coverage is not dispositive of
the coverage issue in all future sexual harassment claims in that jurisdiction. Because
the underlying defendant in Coit was the president of the company, his actions were
automatically imputed to the corporate entity because there was no meaningful dis-
tinction between the two. See Monteleone, supra note 13, at 189 n.8.
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coverage for the sexual harassment claims of an employee.'02
The Coit court held:
Quite apart from the plain meaning of section 533, and its
obvious application to claims of intentional wrongdoing
such as those in issue here, the purpose and public policy
represented by the section, and the public and statutory
policy of this state against sexual harassment of employ-
ees, would not be well served by a ruling which would
exonerate a perpetrator from payment of damages for his
own willful act of sexual gratification, by shifting such li-
ability to an insurer.'0 '
The court seems to have recognized that cost shifting in the
sexual harassment context is inappropriate both for symbolic
reasons and because of potential moral hazard. In addition,
other jurisdictions have held sexual harassment to be so in-
herently harmful that it must be presumed intentional as a
matter of law without any consideration of the subjective in-
tent of either the harasser or the employer.'0 '
Some courts, however, may require insurers to provide cov-
erage for claims of negligent harassing behavior, on the
grounds that such coverage is consistent with the public policy
forbidding insurance for intentional conduct."0 5 For example, in
Seminole Point Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
the court found that, although the insurer was not obligated to
indemnify the insured for claims of intentional harassment, it
was obligated to cover claims of negligent supervision." ' This
court's inquiry focused on whether the conduct was inten-
tional, as demonstrated in the record or the pleadings. A
plaintiff, therefore, may be able to invoke insurance coverage
by alleging negligence on the part of the employer.'" Notably,
102. See id. at 697. The intentional acts exclusion is substantively the same as the
limitation of covered "occurrences" to accidental events. See Machson & Monteleone,
supra note 7, at 699.
103. Coit, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698.
104. See Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
105 See Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44, 47
(D.N.H. 1987).
106. See id.
107. See Outten, supra note 84, at 30-31 ("The way you draft the complaint may
determine whether your claims are covered by the defendant's insurance. For exam-
ple, general commercial liability insurance generally will cover negligent, but not
intentional, acts ... ").
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some courts refuse to allow the parties to recast intentional
conduct as negligence in order to trigger coverage. °
There is also evidence that the original public policy disfa-
voring insuring against intentional conduct is eroding. In
1994, the New York Insurance Department issued a circular
letter stating that it had changed its policy:
[Tihe Department has concluded that liability coverage
for acts of discrimination, when based solely on either
disparate impact (as opposed to disparate treatment) or
vicarious liability, would not be against public policy and
therefore should be permitted.' °9
In its letter, the Insurance Department stated that the rea-
son for its change in position was the growing recognition that
allowing insurance for disparate impact cases and vicarious
employer liability cases might not produce the moral hazard
concerns that had been associated with allowing insurance in
the past. ° The Circular Letter further stated:
[Tihe strong public policy against discrimination of any
kind is, in fact, furthered by permitting coverage of the
kinds described. By bringing to employers' attention
practices that can potentially result in unlawful dis-
crimination, insurer's loss prevention programs and
underwriting standards should discourage such
practices.'
In summary, the employer/insured may argue under several
theories that coverage should be allowed for supervisor hostile
environment sexual harassment claims. First, it may argue
that the behavior of the employer corporation constituted neg-
ligent rather than intentional conduct, notwithstanding any
finding that the individual harasser's conduct was inten-
tional." Second, the employer may argue that, even if its
conduct is found to be intentional, the erosion of the policy
against allowing insurance for intentional conduct stems from
108. See Coit, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697 ("California law and applicable precedents do
not allow the recharacterization of such clearly intentional and willful sexual miscon-
duct as merely negligent or non-willful, so as to trigger insurance coverage.').
109. New York Ins. Dep't Circular Letter No. 6, May 31, 1994 [hereinafter Circular
Letter] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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a recognition that insurance companies are increasingly will-
ing to police against moral hazard, and allowing them to do so
will preserve the deterrent function of Title VII. " '
In any hostile environment sexual harassment case, an in-
quiry into the employer's negligence or intentional behavior
will be central to the coverage litigation. Employers may be
able to invoke coverage by classifying their conduct as negli-
gent or, if their conduct is deemed intentional, by arguing that
insurance companies will police their conduct sufficiently.
III. THE CONVERGENCE ON THE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
As outlined in Part II, recent decisions and policy changes in
the area of employment practices insurance indicate that, in
the future, employers may be allowed expanded liability cov-
erage for the harassing acts of supervisory employees.
Furthermore, it seems that at least part of the coverage in-
quiry will focus on whether the employer's conduct was
negligent. This evolution in the law of insurance is especially
relevant because of the recent debate (discussed in Part I) over
the substantive standards of employer liability for supervisor
sexual harassment.
As noted in Part I, the most prominent standard in use to-
day for deciding employer liability is the "knew-or-should-
have-known" standard commonly drawn from section 219(2)(b)
of the Restatement of Agency."4 This Part argues that, as
courts considering the substantive law of sexual harassment
move toward a negligence-based standard (i.e., "knew-or-
should-have-known") for employer liability, courts resolving
the subsequent coverage disputes will use the record in the
underlying case to find the employer's conduct negligent,
thereby allowing Coverage under the employer's CGL policies.
The tendency for courts to allow expanded coverage for em-
ployers because of the convergence in standards may not be
stated explicitly by the courts. Instead, the trend may simply
be a function of similarity between the coverage court's analy-
sis and that of the court in the underlying sexual harassment
suit. For example, in Seminole Point Hospital, the coverage
113. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1958) (holding the em-
ployer liable if it was "negligent or reckless").
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court determined, under principles of agency law, that cover-
age was available to the employer even though the supervisor's
conduct was not within the scope of his employment. "5 It is
likely that, as the substantive law of employer liability for su-
pervisor sexual harassment develops around negligence
principles (as found in the law of agency), other courts will be
similarly drawn to negligence principles when determining
insurance coverage. This convergence may appear either in the
context of the "occurrence" inquiry or in the context of the con-
sideration of the public policy exclusion for intentional acts." 6
This practice may also be prompted by the gradual erosion of
the public policy against insuring for intentional discrimina-
tion."7
Additionally, the substantive findings in a sexual harass-
ment case may actually control the outcome in the subsequent
coverage litigation.11 8 At least one commentator has noted that
the inquiry into the insurability of conduct under CGL policies
may in fact be determined by the findings of fact regarding in-
tent in the underlying action."9 According to one commentator:
Even when a court does not adopt this presumption [that
certain types of acts are so inherently dangerous that in-
tent must be inferred as a matter of law], coverage for
employment-related liabilities may be barred by a record
in the underlying case that establishes that the injuries
were intentionally caused, or by a finding by the insur-
ance coverage court that the insured intended the
resulting injuries.2 '
Therefore, if the liability court finds the employer liable un-
der a negligence-based theory, a coverage court would be
prevented from finding the act intentional.
Scheuermann also argues that the construction of the un-
derlying statute may control the allocation of the amount of
settlement if the case settles. 2' Therefore, as it becomes easier
for employers to escape substantive liability through the use of
115. See Seminole Point Hosp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44, 47
(D.N.H. 1987).
116. See supra notes 89-111 and accompanying text.
117. See Circular Letter, supra note 109 (allowing coverage when liability is vi-
carious, regardless of intent).
118. See id.
119. See Scheuermann, supra note 9, at 787.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 798.
FALL 19971 283
284 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [
the lenient "knew-or-should-have-known" standard, it simul-
taneously becomes easier for employers to shift any liability
they do incur to their insurer. Such a shift may even be man-
dated in situations where the employer is found negligent."
IV. NORMATIVE SUGGESTIONS
Given the erosion of both the common law and statutory
policies against allowing liability insurance for intentional
acts, as well as the development of policies which specifically
insure for intentional acts, many employers will succeed in ob-
taining insurance coverage for harassment claims. Because of
this, the cost of harassment will shift to insurance companies
when employers are held liable for the acts of supervisory em-
ployees who create hostile work environments. This Part
argues that, instead of analyzing the public policy behind em-
ployer liability under the false assumption that the employer
will actually pay for the defense of the claim and any award,
courts deciding questions of employer liability for supervisor
hostile environment sexual harassment claims should recog-
nize that employers will shift the cost of those suits to
insurers. Part IV critiques the negligence-based standard that
is beginning to control both the underlying employer liability
inquiry and the subsequent coverage inquiry. It then considers
the alternative, non-negligence-based standards for employer
liability for supervisor hostile environment sexual harassment
suits outlined in Part I.
As mentioned above, the negligence-based "knew-or-should-
have-known" standard for employer liability directs a court's
fact-finding toward the behavior of the employer only after it
is formally notified of the harassment.1 3 This standard limits
the employer's responsibility to the plaintiff before the
122. This convergence of substantive sexual harassment law and insurance law
around the negligent/non-negligent distinction may severely disadvantage the plain-
tiff. Applicable workers compensation laws may bar a plaintiff from suing her
employer on negligence grounds. If a plaintiff can only be sure to invoke insurance
coverage by pleading a negligence claim, then she is effectively denied the possibility
of reaching the deep pockets of the insurance company. A plaintiff who, because of the
workers compensation bar, fails to bring a negligence claim may be ensuring that
coverage will be denied. See Shaver v. Laborie Food Mart, Inc., 72 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 330 (E.D. La. 1996); Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 692, 699 (Ct. App. 1993).
123. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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harassment. As long as the employer provides individual
victims with a means to make a formal complaint and takes
appropriate action once they do, the employer has not acted
negligently and will not be subject to liability."' Consequently,
an employer may not be negligent when the acts of its
supervisory employees create a hostile environment so
intimidating that a potential plaintiff is deterred from filing a
complaint.
21
The "knew-or-should-have-known" standard defines em-
ployer conduct as negligent only when the employer does not
establish a means for giving notice of the harassment or does
not act appropriately once such notice is given. Under the
developing practice of allowing employers to shift costs of
negligent conduct, employers who do not have complaint
procedures, and those who do not take appropriate remedial
action, may not have to pay for their negligence because of
coverage under their CGL or EPLI policies. This shift in cost
will likely exacerbate the problem mentioned above-the
injured plaintiff subjected to a hostile environment will be left
without a claim against her employer.26  Furthermore,
insurance companies will only police the behavior of employers
to the extent that those employers are likely to be held liable
in the underlying suit."
124. This standard may not run directly afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in
Meritor that an employer may not escape liability simply by having a formal grievance
procedure. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The "knew-or-
should-have-known" standard imposes the additional requirement of appropriate re-
medial action. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
125. Clearly, this critique would not be valid if courts read the "should have
known" clause in the standard broadly. However, as established above, courts rarely
hold employers liable under the "should have known" provision when an employer has
established a grievance procedure. See supra note 70. Although plaintiffs litigating
under this standard may argue that the complaint procedure was ineffective, courts
have been reluctant to consider this argument. See supra note 71.
126. Because evidence sufficient to prove hostile environment sexual harassment
does not necessarily suffice to establish employer knowledge of such harassment, a
plaintiff who is too intimidated to pursue a valid claim against an offending supervi-
sor may lose her claim against the employer due to the stricter negligence standard
applied in the employer liability context. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d
1155 (11th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, this plaintiff may also be unable to recover from
the individual harasser. See supra note 24.
127. Although it is a valid argument that defense costs alone may suffice to pre-
serve the policing function of insurers in this context, the growing popularity of the
negligence standard may make it easier for employers to win summary judgment
motions based on their "non-negligence." Therefore, defense costs may decrease as the
standard solidifies, thus lessening insurers' incentives to police lax employer prac-
tices.
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Given the weak substantive standard, there is an additional
problem with allowing cost shifting in the sexual harassment
employer liability context. As a regime develops in which
employers are allowed to recover under common CGL policies,
the cost of sexual harassment may be shifted to the pool of
corporations with CGL policies, many of whom actively strive
for work environments free of sexual harassment for purely
ethical reasons. The cost of sexual harassment suits would
thus be distributed among all of the companies who purchase
CGL policies for other reasons, from slip-and-fall to products
liability. Those companies who allow hostile environments to
develop become free-riders.
128
The concept of cost spreading does provide a valuable tool
with which to further critique the negligence-based "knew-or-
should-have-known" standard. As mentioned above, the use of
this standard results in underprevention of sexual harass-
ment; it does not adequately deter conduct which creates
hostile environments."9 The fact that the employer liability
standard does not provide for adequate remedies however,
does not mean that those suits will not be brought. Therefore,
litigation under this inadequate standard is socially financed.
All corporations who maintain CGL policies, and consumers
who buy products or services from them, indirectly bear the
cost of employers' defense of sexual harassment suits in which
sexual harassment may be proven, but for which employers
will not be held liable.
There is a final, powerful argument for rejecting the negli-
gence-based "knew-or-should-have-known" standard. As stated
strongly by one circuit court:
Traditional principles of respondeat superior, as they
obtain in the field of torts, are not altogether suitable for
resolution of questions of Title VII law. The explanation is
manifest: Title VII is a mandate from Congress to cure a
perceived evil-certain types of discrimination in
employment-in a prescribed fashion. Rules of tort law, on
the other hand, have evolved over centuries to meet
128. Incidentally, this problem does not occur when insurance for sexual harass-
ment employer liability is allowed in the form of EPLI policies, where the insurance
pool is limited to those companies who face such a large exposure that they are willing
to pay extremely high premiums for coverage. Notably, however, allowing EPLI cover-
age for employer liability only addresses the problem of excessive risk spreading, it
does not correct the central problem of underprevention identified above.
129. See supra Part 1.
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diverse societal demands by allocating risks of harm and
duties of care. Without clear congressional instruction, we
think it unsafe in developing Title VII jurisprudence to
rely uncritically on dogma thus begotten.30
The Vinson court suggested, therefore, that the general pol-
icy of risk allocation and management that forms the basis of
negligence law is not an appropriate concern when defining
standards of employer liability in harassment cases.''
The Vinson court instead advocated a theory of strict liabil-
ity for supervisor sexual harassment.'32 The court in Vinson
also seemed to anticipate the ultimate holding in Meritor-
that lower courts should apply agency principles to provide a
middle position between strict liability and the notice stan-
dard.'33 The Vinson court noted that some lower courts were
using an expanded notion of respondeat superior to broaden
the scope of employer liability (much as the use of agency law
has expanded employer liability), but stated that "there simply
is no need to so confine either the analysis or the solution
where Title VII applies."3 4 This advocacy of a strict liability
standard has power in the context of this analysis, especially
in light of the increased shifting of the costs of harassment
documented above. It may be that the negligence-based,
"tortified" regime that has developed both in the substantive
standards and in subsequent coverage litigation cannot ade-
quately address the concerns of Title VII. 35
Given this critique of the negligence-based "knew-or-should-
have known" standard and Meritor's explicit rejection of strict
liability, the apparent authority standard emerges as the true
middle ground in the employer liability debate. This standard
will encourage employers to identify harassing dynamics
between their employees but will exonerate them from liability
if they do so and take remedial action. The apparent authority
standard also avoids the convergence in substantive and
coverage standards that exacerbates the problems with the
"knew-or-should-have-known" standard. The explicit differences
130. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (footnotes omitted).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 150.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 151.
135. See MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 172 ("Tort law compensates individuals
for injuries while spreading their costs and perhaps setting examples for foresightful
perpetrators; the purpose of discrimination law is to change the society so that this
kind of injury need not and does not recur.').
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between the substantive and coverage standards will diminish
cost-shifting because coverage courts will be unable to rely
directly upon the findings of the court in the underlying sexual
harassment suit. Furthermore, policing by insurers will
increase the power of the apparent authority standard to focus
on pre-harassment workplace dynamics. Because insurance
companies will have to be concerned with more than merely
making sure employers act non-negligently, they may be forced
to act affirmatively to prevent harassment, better effectuating
the goals of Title VII.
CONCLUSION
The current lack of a settled standard in either the substan-
tive or coverage contexts of sexual harassment litigation is
extremely costly. The uncertainty resulting from insurance
coverage for employer liability for supervisor hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims has produced a coverage
litigation explosion which mirrors the growing number of un-
derlying sexual harassment claims. This social cost presents a
very real and underutilized argument for immediate clarifica-
tion of the substantive employer liability standard in sexual
harassment law.
However, the current discussion of the standards for em-
ployer liability for supervisor hostile environment sexual
harassment and the standards controlling coverage disputes
concerning that liability has been too narrow to produce an
intelligent system of employer liability. In order to develop an
effective preventive and compensatory mechanism for supervi-
sor hostile environment sexual harassment, courts must
consider the probable shift of the cost of sexual harassment
suits from corporations to insurers. Conversely, in order to ef-
fectively prevent moral hazard in the shift of liability from
employers to insurers, courts must consider the conduct that
substantive standards will encourage or discourage. Such con-
sideration begins with the recognition that an employer
liability regime based on negligence does not adequately ad-
dress the problem of sexual harassment, either by
compensating the victims of such harassment or by preventing
its occurrence.
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